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FIREARM REGULATION
JoHN BRABNER-SMITH*
Kidnaping, racketeering and gangsterism, which reached a climax of publicity in
the last twelve months with such front page cases as the Urschel kidnaping, the
income tax evasion trial of the New Jersey racketeer and beer baron, "Waxey" Gor-
don, and the final victory of law enforcement agents over the Touhy and Dillinger
gangs, have greatly stimulated the interest of the American public in criminal law
and law enforcement. Efforts of the present Administration to improve criminal
practice and procedure and to secure federal legislation to aid in the suppression of
crimes of violence have also been a cause of this awakening interest, as well as a
partial result of it.
Among these bills sponsored by the Attorney General of the United States, Homer
S. Cummings, none has received more general attention and bitter criticism than the
bill proposing to regulate the manufacture, importation, and disposition of certain
types of firearms. The purpose of this article is to discuss briefly the various forms
of firearm regulation in this country and abroad, proposed federal and state legisla-
tion, and the constitutionality thereof.
FORMS OF FIREARM LEGISLATION
Regulating the Carrying of Weapons
The earliest antecedent of firearm regulation among English-speaking people was
the development of the English common law which held it a crime against the public
peace to ride or go about with dangerous or unusual weapons. This common law
principle was later enacted into statute in 1328 by the Statute of Northampton.'
Among the first enactments of many of our states were provisions concerning
weapons, which modified or enlarged upon this early English law. For example, the
Criminal Code of the Province of Massachusetts, adopted in 1692-3,2 provided that
justices of the peace could arrest any person riding or going about armed offensively,
could commit him to prison until sureties were found for the peace, and could forfeit
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his armor and weapons. This law was reenacted, except for the forfeiture provision,
in 1795, after Massachusetts became a state.3
These early statutes either made it unlawful to carry certain weapons such as
pistols, dirks, and bowie knives, exempting certain classes of persons, such as peace
officers, and exempting certain places, as the owner's premises or place of business; or
provided that it was unlawful to carry weapons "concealed"; or prohibited certain
persons, such as minors, from carrying weapons; or prohibited the carriage of
weapons in certain places. Most of these statutes were soon challenged as uncon-
stitutional, but almost invariably they were upheld. The first volume of Alabama
Supreme Court Reports recorded the case of State v. Reid,8 decided at Montgomery
in 1840. The Alabama statute prohibiting the carrying of any species of concealed
firearms about the person was upheld in this case. In 1831, shortly after Indiana
became a state, a statute similar to that of Alabama was enacted, which, when ques-
tioned, was upheld by the Indiana Supreme Court.6 In 1839 the Arkansas Supreme
Court upheld the local firearm statute which made it a misdemeanor to wear a pistol,
dirk or other concealed weapon except on a journey This form of firearm regula-
tion is contained in the Uniform Firearms Act and in many present state statutes.
Regulating the Sale or Disposal of Firearms
Regulations governing the disposition of firearms and regulating dealers therein
appear in numerous state statutes and have been incorporated in the Uniform Fire-
arms Act.8 These provisions are extremely varied. Such legislation may include a
prohibition upon the sale to certain persons, such as minors, drug addicts, and crim-
inals; a prohibition upon advertising firearms for sale; provisions for keeping records
of all sales; provisions for formal application for firearms, identifying prospective
purchasers, and prohibiting delivery until notification to the police or until the elapse
of a period of time; or a prohibition upon sales by pawnbrokers. The principal
weakness in this type of law is that there is nothing to prevent a criminal from
obtaining a gun in a nearby state which has no similar restrictive regulation. Only
through legislation national in scope can there be effected a uniform and successful
regulation of dealers and manufacturers in firearms and of the disposal of such
weapons.
Requiring License to Purchase or Possess
The first instance of state regulation of the purchase and possession of firearms is
found in the controversial Sullivan-Law in New York, enacted in i889.9 Since then,
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Massachusetts, West Virginia, Michigan, New Jersey, and Missouri have adopted
somewhat similar legislation.10 The objection raised to this type of regulation is
the usual objection raised against all firearm legislation, namely, that it burdens the
law-abiding citizen and does not keep the pistol out of the hands of the criminal,
who will not obey the law but who will steal, bootleg, or, himself, make the gun.
But proponents of this form of firearm control do not deny this. In fact, one benefit
to be derived from this type of firearm legislation is that it provides a basis for easily
convicting gun-carrying gangsters when witnesses have been intimidated or when
there is not sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for a major
offense. Proving that a gunman possessed a gun without a license is a simple matter
compared with proving that he participated in a bank robbery. It is a type of "public
enemy" statute, simple in operation. For example, in 1933, 1,003 persons were
arrested and temporarily detained for carrying concealed weapons in violation of
the New York Sullivan Law. One hundred fifty-four of these persons are now
serving prison sentences, many of them notorious gangsters, such as Morris Gross-
man, alias Irving Bitz, Harry Kagel, and Stanley Tomasetta.
This form of legislation is also attacked because it provides for identification of
the purchaser and, consequently, generally provides for fingerprinting, since this is
the best method of identification. Although the hostile reaction to fingerprinting is
gradually disappearing, this method of identification is still bitterly opposed even by
some law-abiding citizens.
This and other technical requirements of the Sullivan Law and similar legislation
are annoying to those who have carried firearms for years without harm to anyone.
It is seriously and heatedly questioned whether the New York law does not infringe
more than is justified upon personal liberty, considering the civil benefits derived. It
cannot be denied, however, that the percentage of homicides and suicides by firearms
is considerably less where rigid firearm laws are enforced, as in England, Holland,
and even New York State, than where there are few or no regulatory provisions."
Increasing Penalties for Use or Possession of Weapons by Criminals.
Most of the states have enacted statutes making specially punishable an assault
with a "deadly weapon," with a "dangerous weapon" or with a "pistol or revolver."
The mere pointing of a gun at another, within shooting distance, is regarded as an
assault at common law, whether the gun is loaded or not.
Moreover, the laws of many states provide an additional penalty in the case of
one who commits a crime of violence when armed. The recent Federal Bank
Robbery Act' 2 has such a provision. The Uniform Firearms Act," provides an
" See Imlay, Uniform Firearms Act Reaffirmed (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 799, and The Uniform Firearms
Act (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 767; Chamberlain, Legislatures and the Pistol Problem (1925) 1x A. B. A. J.
596.
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Life Insurance Company, Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Commerce (Senate) on S. 885,
S. 2258, and S. 3680, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., May 28, 1934, at p. 32.
"48 STAT. 783 (1934), z2 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1934) §588b (b). 'See note 8, supra.
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additional penalty if a person commits or attempts to commit a crime of violence
when armed witha pistol or revolver. A few recent state statutes, as in California,1 4
deny the privilege of probation to one who has been convicted of an offense while
armed.
FIREARM LEGISLATION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE
The British Firearms Act' 5 not only is more rigorous and burdensome upon the
inhabitants of Great Britain than any proposed federal regulation could be upon the
American people, but, considering all its provisions, it is more drastic than any
present state legislation, including New York's Sullivan Law.
The British Act is based on regulating the sale, as well as the use and possession,
of every kind of firearm except antiques and of the ammunition therefor. Only
those individuals can obtain firearm certificates who are approved by the local chief
of police, with certain exceptions such as law enforcement officials, and certain classes
of persons are prohibited from obtaining any weapons. The certificate, which also
limits the quantity of ammunition that can be purchased for each gun, must be kept
on the person while carrying the gun. Otherwise the firearm or ammunition may
be seized and detained. The certificate fee is approximately $25.00. The certificate
is good for but three years and is revocable. There is an additional hunting license
fee.
Dealers are rigidly supervised and must make reports of all sales of weapons or
ammunition within forty-eight hours. Such sales can only be made to identified
certificate holders and must be pursuant to instructions in the certificate. Pawn-
brokers cannot deal in firearms, and all manufacturers and repairmen are supervised.
Practically all the European countries have some form of firearm regulation,
ranging from Amsterdam's complete ban on concealed weapons to the Swiss national
provision making it obligatory upon every able-bodied adult male to possess and
know how to use a military rifle. Most of the Swiss cantons have restrictions on
pistols and revolvers, however, and these weapons are rarely seen in Switzerland.
THE UNIFoRm FREAMUS AcT
After the World War the growing current of public opinion against the right of
individuals to possess or carry freely revolvers and pistols became more assertive. An
effort was made in a number of states to adopt the rigid provisions of the Sullivan
Law in New York, which is the severest anti-firearm legislation in the United States.
As the result the United States Revolver Association endeavored to draft legislation
of a less drastic nature to be urged as uniform legislation throughout the states, in
order to forestall laws which might seriously interfere with the privileges of pistol
shooting and hunting.
This proposed uniform firearm law, which adopted various provisions from exist-
ing state firearm laws, was called to the attention of the National Conference of
"CAL. LAws 1933, c. 814. 10 io & ii GEo. V, C. 43 (920).
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Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1923. The substance of these provisions
was enacted in the California,16 North Dakota,' 7 and New Ha~npshire Firearms
Acts 8 of that year. In 1925 the first draft of the proposed "Uniform Act to Regulate
the Sale and Possession of Firearms" was discussed at the Conference, and, after
numerous changes, was adopted by the Conference in I926.9 This proposed act at
once was severely criticized as not being sufficiently drastic. These criticisms were
principally made by law enforcement officers. The National Crime Commission re-
ceived so many protests that it organized a committee to study and propose uniform
firearm legislation. The resulting uniform act was considerably more drastic than
the act proposed by the Conference. As the result both the Conference and the
American Bar Association reconsidered the previous act. For four years there were
frequent meetings between committees of the National Crime Commission and the
Conference, and eventually the present Uniform Act was presented. This proposed
law is summarized as follows:20
i. The carrying of a "pistol," defined as any firearm with a barrel less than
twelve inches in length, in a vehicle or concealed on the person is forbidden to all
except law enforcement officers and certain others, except upon the issuance of a
license. (No license is required, therefore, for the purchase or possession of a pistol
so long as it is not carried beyond the limits of the owner's abode or place of
business.)
2. A crime of violence committed by one armed with a "pistol" carries a penalty
in addition to that prescribed for the crime, and the fact that one charged with a
crime of violence is armed and has no license is prima facie evidence of his intention
to commit such a crime.
3. The delivery of "pistols" is forbidden to certain classes of persons, such as drug
addicts, habitual drunkards and minors under eighteen, if there is reasonable cause
to believe that the applicant is in one of the designated classes; and possession is
prohibited to any person convicted of a crime of violence.
4. The sale of "pistols" is regulated by licensing the dealer. The sale may be
made only after forty-eight hours have elapsed from the time the purchaser makes
application for the firearm, and such application must contain certain information
identifying the applicant and the weapon to be sold. A copy of this application must
be sent by the dealer to local police authorities. Moreover, the purchaser must be
personally known to the seller.
5. The pawning of pistols is forbidden.
6. A penalty is imposed for altering or removing the identifying marks of the
I CAL. LAWS 1923, c. 339; CaL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act x97o.
"'N. D. LAws 1923, c. 266; N. D. Cohn. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) C. 54 A, §9803.
I-N. H. LAws 1923, c. x8; N. H. PuB. LAws (x926) c. 149.
"NAT. CONF. COMM. UN. STATE LAws, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS, 1925, 294, 316; ibid., 1926, 571,
575-
2 See Imlay, supra note so; Hearings before Committee on Ways & Means (House of Representatives)
on National Firearms Bill, May 14-15, 1934, at pp. 102, 127.
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firearm, and the possession of a weapon from which the identifying marks have been
removed is prima fade evidence that the possessor removed such marks.
This Act with minor changes was adopted for the District of Columbia by the
Congress in 1932,21 and by the State of.Pennsylvania in I93I. -
THE UNIFORM MACHINE GUN AcT
The growth of armed gangsterism has resulted in the use of more deadly weapons
by criminals. The automatic pistol replaced the revolver, and now the submachine
gun, a partly concealable gun shooting automatically 20 to ioo of the ordinary 45
caliber Colt cartridges at one time, has become the favorite weapon of gangsters.
Recently, there have been enacted in some states laws against the purchase, pos-
session, or carriage of such machine guns. In 1932, a Uniform Machine Gun Act 23
was presented by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Therein,
the possession or use of a machine gun of any kind for offensive purpose is declared
to be a crime. Such possession or use is presumed if the gun is found on premises
not owned or rented for legitimate use by the possessor or user of the gun; if the
gun is in possession of, or used by, either an unnaturalized foreigner or a person
previously convicted of a crime of violence; if the machine gun is of the kind most
commonly used by criminals and has not been registered as provided in the Act; or
if shells adapted to use in that particular weapon are found in the immediate vicinity
thereof.
There is also a provision concerning registration of machine guns by the manufac-
turer thereof, and a provision for an additional penalty if a machine gun is possessed
or used in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a crime of violence. In
view of the new National Firearms Act,2 4 discussed hereafter, the need for such
legislation is greatly lessened.
THE NATIONAL FiREARPis AcT
While there has been some effort to obtain federal legislation restricting the
promiscuous sale or transportation of certain firearms, with the exception of the
innocuous measure prohibiting shipping revolvers through the mails (I have before
me a catalogue advertising $6.95 revolvers which "must be shipped by express"), no
such legislation has been effectively sponsored for passage until the memorable 73rd
session of Congress which has just terminated.
A number of bills regulating the manufacture, disposal, or transportation of small
firearms were introduced in this session. Some of these bills regulated transportation
of small firearms or ammunition by exercising the federal power over interstate com-
merce. Other bills were based on the federal taxing power. S. 2840,2 a bill to pro-
= 47 STAT. 650 (1932). This act includes many provisions not contained in the Uniform Act. See 9
UN. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1933) 38.
'PA. LANws 1931, No. 158. 29 UN. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1933) 63.
"Act of June 26, 1934, Pub. No. 474, 73rd Cong. 2nd Sess.
'eIntroduced by Senator Ashurst of Arizona on Feb. 21, 1934, 78 CONO. REc. 3026.
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vide for the taxation of manufacturers, importers and dealers in small firearms and
machine guns, required the registration of pawnbrokers and other dealers in used
firearms, as well as of manufacturers and importers. By reason of the tax imposed,
proponents of this bill expected that most, if not all, pawnbrokers, who have been
the principal legitimate source of supply of dangerous weapons to the criminal
element, would cease to handle such weapons. It was also expected that this pro-
vision would furnish some assurance of the reliability of such manufacturers, im-
porters, and dealers.
S. 2844,26 a bill to tax the sale or other disposal of firearms and machine guns by
importers, manufacturers and others, and to restrain the importation thereof, pro-
vided for a stamp tax on the disposal of every small firearm and machine gun, and
for the positive identification of each recipient of such weapon, and otherwise reg-
ulated importation, disposal and transportation thereof.
These bills eventually were combined into one bill, entitled "A bill to provide for
the taxation of manufacturers, importers and dealers in small firearms and machine
guns, to tax the sale or other disposal of such weapons, and to restrain importation
and regulate transportation thereof." This consolidated bill, with minor changes,
was presented in the House by Congressman Sumners, as H. R. 9066, and was re-
ferred to the Committee on Ways and Means, where public hearings were had.
Considerable opposition developed from certain rifle associations which sought, with
eventual success, to have pistols and revolvers eliminated from the bill. There was
also some opposition, on the part of manufacturers, to the amount of the tax sug-
gested. The bill, as eventually reported, was practically the same as was discussed by
the Committee, except that pistols and revolvers were omitted. It was hurriedly
passed in this form at the last moment before Congress adjourned. 27
It was believed that a bill based upon the taxing power of the federal government
and analogous to the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act28 would be preferable to one based
on the interstate commerce power, for the following reasons: First, it would be a
source of revenue. Secondly, it would permit the federal government to exert some
control over ownership of small firearms as well as over the interstate shipment
thereof. Under the revenue measure, after a period of time it would be possible to
ascertain by proper credentials the identity of the possessor of every small firearm
and machine gun and his lawful right to such possession, and a means of speedy
punishment for unlawfully possessing such weapons would be thereby provided.
Finally, this act, being patterned closely after the Harrison Act, would have the
advantage of numerous appellate and Supreme Court decisions29 to sustain its
constitutionality.
It was not expected that this proposed legislation would keep all revolvers, sawed-
' See note 25, supra. ' Supra note 24.
2938 STAT. 785 (1914), 26 U. S. C. A. §§2is, 69i-7o8.
'The Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act was held constitutional in U. S. v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup.
Ct. 214 (igig), discussed infra, p. 408.
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off shotguns, and machine guns out of the hands of criminals. It was believed,
however, that law-abiding citizens would respect its provisions, and that the criminal
element would violate it, thus laying a foundation for forfeiture of their weapons,
and for their imprisonment for violating its provisions. Because of the omission of
revolvers and pistols from the bill, the Act is now a mere skeleton, applying only to
machine guns, "sawed-off" shotguns and rifles, and firearm silencers.
The first section of this Act defines the terms used therein. The term "firearms"
is defined to include only the weapons above mentioned.
The second section incorporates, in substance, S. 2840, providing for the annual
registration and taxation of importers, manufacturers, dealers and pawnbrokers in
such firearms.
Section 3 imposes a tax on the transfer of such firearms, such tax to be represented
by appropriate revenue stamps. Section 4 provides that no such firearm shall be
disposed of except in pursuance of an order from the person seeking to obtain the
firearm, on a form drafted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, such order to
identify the purchaser by fingerprints, and otherwise. If the order is accepted, the
person disposing of the firearm must set forth in it the mark identifying the weapon,
affix proper revenue stamps to it, and return it to the applicant, forwarding a copy to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Every subsequent transferor must transfer
his stamp-affixed order with the gun. The transfer of firearms from manufacturer
or dealer to other dealers is exempt from this section. Section 6 makes it unlawful
to receive or possess any firearm disposed of in violation of Sections 3 or 4.
Section 5 provides for registering all such firearms with the local collector of
internal revenue within sixty days after the Act goes into effect. The object of this
provision is to determine whether a person who is arrested with a machine gun in
his possession owned it when the Act went into effect. If he did not, a tax should
have been paid on the subsequent transfer and he should have a stamp-affixed order
form in his possession. Generally gangsters steal the arms found in their possession,
so this provision will aid enforcement officers to find out at once whether the pos-
sessor rightfully possesses the weapon.
Section 7 provides that any such firearm disposed of in violation of the proposed
act shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Section 8 requires every manufacturer and importer of any such firearm to
identify it by placing thereon a number or other identification mark approved by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. A further provision penalizes those who
remove this number or identifying mark, and mere possession of such a weapon
with the mark obliterated raises a presumption of unlawful possession.
Section 9 provides that importers, manufacturers, and dealers must keep such
books and records and render such returns concerning transactions in these weapons
as shall be required by regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.
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Section io limits the importation of these firearms to such as are unique or of a
type not obtainable in the United States, and the purpose of such importation must
be lawful. Such firearms may be imported pursuant to such regulations as the Sec-
retary of the Treasury may prescribe. This section makes it unlawful (a) fraud-
ulently or knowingly to import any such firearm in violation of the provisions of
the act, or (b) to assist in so doing knowing the same to have been imported contrary
to law, or (c) to receive, conceal, or in any manner facilitate transportation, conceal-
ment or sale of any such firearm after being imported, knowing the same to have
been imported contrary to law. Possession of such an imported firearm is deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless such possession is explained to the
satisfaction of the jury. This section is similar to certain provisions in the Act of
February 9, 1909, c. ioo, as amended,30 which regulates the importation of narcotic
drugs. The provisions of that Act were upheld in Yee Hem v. United States.31
Section ii makes it unlawful for any person who has neither registered his fire-
arm, nor paid a transfer tax on it, to send, ship, carry or deliver it in interstate
commerce.
Section 12 requires the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of
the Secretary of the Treasury, to make all needful rules and regulations to carry the
Act into effect.
Section 13 provides that the Act shall not apply to the disposal of such firearms
to the United States Government or other political units, or to any peace officer as
shall be designated by regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. More-
over, antiques and similar unserviceable weapons are exempted.
Section 14 imposes a penalty of not more than $2,000 fine or imprisonment for
not more than five years, or both, upon any person failing to comply with the
requirements of the Act.
Section 15 provides that existing taxes on firearms shall not apply to firearms
which are included in its scope.
Section I6 provides that if any provision of the Act is held invalid, the remainder
of the Act shall not be effected thereby. In the light of such United States Supreme
Court decisions as Nigro v. United States3 2 and United States v. Doremus,33 uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act as a valid revenue meas-
ure, there cannot be much doubt that the National Firearms Act also is a valid
revenue measure. In the latter case the Supreme Court held that the power conferred
by the Constitution to levy excise taxes uniformly throughout the United States is
to be exercised at the discretion of Congress; that, while Congress may not exert
authority which is wholly reserved to the states, where the provisions of the law
enacted have some reasonable relation to the revenue power, the fact that they have
been impelled by a motive, or may accomplish a purpose, other than the raising of
2035 SrAr. 614 (19o); 21 U. S. C. A. §§173, 174.
31268 U. S. 178, 45 Sup. Ct. 470 (1925).
2276 U. S. 332, 48 Sup. Ct. 388 (1928). 'Supra note 29.
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revenue cannot invalidate them; nor can the fact that they affect the conduct of
business which is subject to regulation by the state police power. It is believed that
the individual provisions of this Act which, so far as possible, follow like provisions
of the Harrison Act, similarly would be upheld, if they should be tested in the
Supreme Court.3 4
Section 17 provides that the Act shall take effect thirty days after its enactment
and entitles it "The National Firearms Act."
It will be observed that this federal firearm legislation follows the principles of
the Uniform State Firearm Act in that sales are regulated through licensing the
dealer, the pawnshop business in firearms is controlled, the obliteration of identifying
marks is discouraged, and governmental agencies and antique weapons are exempted
from the provisions. In addition, control over importation and manufacture is
secured, and registration of weapons covered by the Act is provided for-results
which could not be attained effectively by individual state legislation.
FIREARm LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO "BEAR ARMs"
Neither the National Firearms Act, nor any of the state statutes with respect to
firearms, infringe, in the least, upon the constitutional provisions which guarantee to
the people the right to keep and bear arms. The Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution, from which most of the similar state constitutional provisions
have been copied, provides that
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
History and Purpose of Provision
The right to keep and bear arms, whether collectively or individually, was not a
right guaranteed by the common law. As has been seen, as early as 1328 a statute
in England3 5 provided that no man should
go nor ride armed by night or by day in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the justices
or other ministers, nor in no part elsewhere upon pain, . . .
At the same time landed proprietors were required to maintain in readiness at their
own expense certain arms and equipment for military service when required by the
government. These landed proprietors, with their retainers, constituted the militia
of the kingdom. When James II succeeded to the throne he increased the body of
soldiers which acted as the guardian of the throne into a regular army for military
service. Finally, after Monmouth's rebellion, he began to disarm Protestant subjects.
Then occurred the Great Rebellion, and James was forced to abdicate the throne.
As the result of this rebellion the Declaration of Rights was presented to the reigning
r' That the statute is not violative of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution is the
thesis of the succeeding section.
' Statute of Northampton, supra note i.
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Prince of Orange, who yielded assent to its provisions. Parliament then confirmed
this Declaration in the Bill of Rights. One of the provisions was the following
guarantee:
That the subjects which are Protestant may have arms for their defense suitable to their
condition, and as allowed by law.36
In the American colonies the situation was similar to that in England in the
i 4 th century. The male citizens were enrolled for military service and were required
by law to maintain specified arms and equipment. Moreover, there was as much
grievance amongst the colonists because the king had established troops in the colonies
under the direct command of royal officers as there had been over the quartering of
Catholic soldiers by James II amongst the rebellious people of Great Britain. Hence,
when the colonies had rebelled against Great Britain, there was incorporated in the
new Bill of Rights-the first ten amendments to the Constitution-a provision very
similar to the above provision of the original Bill of Rights, namely, the Second
Amendment quoted above.
It is quite evident from the history of this provision that its purpose was to pre-
serve the state and to aid in the enforcement of law. It assured the people that a
powerful executive could not organize a strong army and, by disarming the citizenry,
place them at his mercy, as the Stuarts had attempted to do in England. This is
further indicated by the specific language of this Amendment 7
Moreover, it is evident that the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, and
especially the Second Amendment, were not intended to set forth any novel prin-
ciples of government but only to assure the retention of the principles established by
the original Bill of Rights with recognized exceptions, including the power of the
state to regulate the promiscuous carrying of deadly weapons. Our Supreme Court
has clearly stated this in the case of Robertson v. Baldwin:38
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution,
commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel prin-
ciples of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we
had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been
subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In
incorporating these principles into the fundamental law there was no intention of disre-
garding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally
expressed. Thus, the freedom of speech and of the press (art. i) does not permit the
publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to
public morals or private reputation; the right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2)
is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons; . . . Nor does the
provision that an accused person shall be confronted with the witnesses against him
'See opinion of Justice Lumpkin in Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1, 72 S. E. 260 (gxx); Emery,
The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms (1915) 28 HARe. L. REv. 473, 474.
'Emery, supra note 36, at 477; McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms (1928) x2 MAtQUErra
L. REv. 138, 139.
3 165 U. S. 275, 281, 17 Sup. Ct. 326, 329 (1897).
FntAmi RIEGuLATioN
prevent the admission of dying declarations, or the depositions of witnesses who have died
since the former trial.39
judicial Construction of the Second Amendment
(a) Interpretation of the words, "the people."
As used in the Constitution, the term "the people" connotes the citizens in a
collective sovereign sense. In the Civil Rights Cases,40 the court quotes from the
Dred Scott decision as follows:
The judgment of the court was that the words "people of the United States" and
"citizens" meant the same thing, both describing "the political body who, according to our
republican institutions, form the sovereignty and hold the power and conduct the govern-
ment through their representatives;" that "they are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign
people,' and every citizen is one of this people and a constituent member of this sov-
ereignty;" ...
The word "people" means only the collective body, and individual rights are not pro-
tected by the constitutional clause. 41
It will be noted that persons are designated by four different terms in the Consti-
tution: "the people"; "person" (and "persons"); "citizen" (and "citizens"); "sub-
ject" (and "subjects").
The expression "the people" is on each occasion used to denote people in a col-
lective sense, as "We the people of the United States . .." (the Preamble); "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, .... (Fourth Amend-
ment).
When the drafters of the Constitution desired to refer to the individual or to
individual rights, privileges, or immunities, they never referred to "the people" but
referred to "persons," as "the Electors shall ... make a list of all the Persons voted
for ...(Article II, Section i); "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, except on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
.. " (Fifth Amendment). Where the substance required such specification, ref-
erence was made to "citizens" or "subjects."42
It is worthy of note that in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution both
terms are used.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(b) Interpretation of the words, "bear arms."
The expression "to bear arms" should be distinguished from "to carry weapons."
'To the same effect are the following: Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874); City of Salina v. Blaksley,
72 Karns. 230, 83 Pac. 619 (905); Emery, supra note 36, at 476; McKenna, supra note 37, at X39.
to 109 U. S. 3, 31, 3 Sup. Ct. i8, 36 (1883).
"See also City of Salina v. Blaksley, supra note 39; Emery, supra note 36, at 476-477; McKenna,
supra note 37, at 145.
As in U. S. CONSr. Art. III, §2: "The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies ... between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
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The former originally referred to the arming of an organized group with weapons
of warfare, such as swords, muskets, and artillery. The latter expression has been
used to denote weapons generally concealable on the person, such as blackjacks,
bowie knives, pistols, and such other weapons as are commonly employed in brawls
or by criminals.
The very words, "bear arms," had then and now have, a technical meaning. The
"arms bearing" part of a people, were its men fit for service on the field of battle. That
country was "armed" that had an army ready for fight. The call "to arms," was a call to
put on the habiliments of battle, and I greatly doubt if in any good author of those days,
a use of the word arms when applied to a people, can be found, which includes pocket-
pistols, dirks, sword-canes, toothpicks, Bowie-knives, and a host of other relics of past
barbarism, or inventions of modern savagery of like character. In what manner the right
to keep and bear these pests of society, can encourage or secure the existence of a militia,
and especially of a well regulated militia, I am not able to divine.43
(c) Interpretation of: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, ..."
The purpose of the Second Amendment is set forth in this phrase. The right of
the people to bear arms is protected by the Constitution because a well-regulated
militia is necessary for the security of the state. The entire provision must be read
in the light of this expression, and no regulation or restriction of firearms or weapons
is in conflict with this Amendment unless it substantially impedes the maintenance
of a militia sufficiently well-equipped to assure the safety of the state.
Upon its very front, as we have said, the object of the clause is declared to be to secure
to the state a well regulated militia. Has this declaration no significance? Is the clause
to be interpreted without reference to it? On the contrary, by the well settled rules for
the interpretation of laws, as well as by the dictates of common sense, the object and
intent of the law is the prime key to its meaning. A well regulated militia may fairly
mean--"the arms-bearing population of the state, organized under the law, in possession
of weapons for defending the state, and accustomed to their use." The constitution de-
clares that as such a militia is necessary to the existence of a free state, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. . . .If the general right to carry and
to use them exist; if they may at pleasure be borne and used in the fields, and in the
woods, on the highways and byways, at home and abroad, the whole declared purpose of
the provision is fulfilled. The right to keep and to bear arms so that the state may be
secured in the existence of a well regulated militia, is fully attained. 44
Types of Valid Firearm Legislation
In England, as stated above, the Protestant people have been guaranteed the right
to "bear arms," but this has never been regarded as inconsistent with restriction, and
even prohibition, upon the individual in the obtaining or carrying of certain weapons,
where such legislation has been necessary as a police measure. The present British
Firearms Act 45 is much more drastic than any similar legislation in this country.
'Hill v. State, supra note 39, at 474. See Robertson v. Baldwin, supra note 38; English v. State, 35
Tex. 475 (1872); Strickland v. State, supra note 36.
"Hill v. State, supra note 39, at 475- "Supra note 15.
FRintEA~ REGuLATION
So, also, in those states of the United States which have a constitutional provision
similar to the Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution, it is recognized that,
in the proper exercise of the police power, the carrying of weapons by the individual
may be regulated, restricted, and even prohibited by statute.46 Such regulation,
restriction, or prohibition applies
(i) to the carrying of certain types of weapons, such as concealed weapons or
weapons habitually carried by criminals to terrorize the community;
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(2) to the carrying of weapons in certain public places and peaceable assemblies,
such as churches, courts of justice, street parades;48
(3) to the carrying of weapons by certain individuals, such as boys or persons of
dissolute habits. 49
Federal Firearm Regulation
The National Firearms Act is more restricted in scope than the regulations listed
above since it provides only for the taxation of manufacturers, importers and dealers
in certain small firearms and machine guns, for the taxation of the sale or other
disposal of such weapons, and for the restriction of importation thereof. It includes
only sawed-off shotguns, firearm silencers, and machine guns, although the next
session of Congress may extend it to include pistols and revolvers. There is no
restriction upon the possession and use of such weapons, the only regulation, in so
far as the individual is concerned, being the provision to identify the present owner
of each such weapon, and subsequent purchasers and transferees. In its operation,
the Act will not deny, nor seriously restrict, the right of the individual to carry
weapons; a fortiori it will not deny to the people the right to keep and bear arms.
The propriety of reasonable regulations of the individual by the federal govern-
ment in conjunction with its power to levy and collect taxes has been pointed out
earlier in this paper. ° To the extent that the regulation imposed by the proposed
measure restricts the obtaining of certain weapons, the decisions and comments
previously set forth concerning the right of the states to enact regulatory provisions
in connection with the possession and carrying of firearms, irrespective of state con-
stitutional provisions concerning the bearing of arms, are applicable. So, also, are
the well-recognized exceptions of the common law to the original provision in the
Bill of Rights, which first guaranteed the right to bear arms.
'It is settled that the Second Amendment, similar to the other provisions of the first ten Amendments,
affects only action by the federal government, and is not a restriction upon the states. U. S. v. Cruick-
shank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1875). See FREDERICK, PIsrOL REGULATION (93 r ) 25.
'Strickland v. State, supra note 36, and cases cited therein; Darling v. Warden of the City Prison,
29 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 66, 139 N. Y. Supp. 277 (1913).
'Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 6 Sup. Ct. 58o (1886); Hill v. State, supra note 39; McKenna,
supra note 37, at 138.
Darling v. Warden of the City Prison, supra note 47; Emery, supra note 36, at 476.
roP. 408, supra.
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CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are warranted from this discussion:
i. The guarantee contained in both the federal and state constitutions of the
right to bear arms is not infringed either by existing or proposed legislation regulat-
ing use, possession, or disposal of small firearms.
2. Certain types of firearm legislation, such as regulation of importation, manu-
facture or sale of firearms, or registration thereof, can be successful only if national
in scope. Federal legislation is restricted, however, because of the limited powers
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution.
3. There is a certain field where state regulation is necessary, as where direct
exercise of the police power is required. An example is legislation increasing the
penalty for committing a crime of violence while armed, or prohibiting certain
persons to carry weapons.
4. Immediate and studious consideration should be given to the advisability of
applying the provisions of the National Firearms Act to pistols and revolvers, or
5. The Uniform Firearms Act should be reconsidered with a view to omitting
provisions which would be duplicated by federal legislation, and to improving its
effectiveness, if this is possible, in the light of experience in those states where its
provisions have been in effect.
